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Introduction
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has rapidlybecome a worldwide pandemic ushering in a global
health and economic crisis. In the absence of vaccines or
definitive drug therapies, current strategies against COVID-
19 rely on preventing the transmission of disease through
nonpharmaceutical interventions such as social distancing
and proper hand hygiene. For practical and perhaps ethical
reasons, the clinical efficacy of these public health measures
for managing pandemics has not been demonstrated in ran-
domized controlled clinical trials. Accordingly, guideline
recommendations for using nonpharmaceutical interventions
are based primarily on observational and modeling studies
and on expert opinion. A recent position paper from the
World Health Organization (WHO) graded the quality of
evidence to be low for the efficacy of social distancing inter-
ventions for mitigating pandemic influenza.1 Nonetheless,
observational studies have credited nonpharmaceutical inter-
ventions with slowing the spread of COVID-19 in China and
on the west coast of the United States.2–4 These apparent sal-
utary effects in the COVID-19 pandemic mirror the benefits of
similar interventions observed in prior influenza pandemics.5
Further confirmation of the importance of these measures has
come with the loosening of social distancing practices and
subsequent rapid surge of cases in the Sunbelt region of the
United States as the country attempted to reopen.
In addition to general measures such as closure of schools
and nonessential businesses, public health guidelines for
managing COVID-19 include a series of specific, quantitative
recommendations that are the focus of this analysis
(Table 1).6–8 Among these are explicit rules regarding in-
terpersonal distancing (6 feet), limitation of group gatherings
(10 people), duration of quarantine for exposed individuals
(14 days), and duration of handwashing (20 seconds). These
recommendations have received wide interest from the in-
ternational medical community and general public. The goal
of this analysis is to critically evaluate the evidence basis
behind these specific, quantitative nonpharmaceutical inter-
ventions that have a prominent role in mitigating the current
COVID-19 pandemic.
Interpersonal Distancing with 6 Feet of Separation
There is a lack of unanimity among health organizations
as to the recommended distance for interpersonal spacing
(Table 1). The US Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) states, ‘‘COVID-19 spreads mainly among
people who are in close contact (within about six feet) for a
prolonged period.’’9 Accordingly, the CDC recommends a
6-foot distance between people. The WHO recommends 1
meter, only about half the distance recommended by the
CDC. In contrast, a 2-meter distance is recommended in the
United Kingdom while other countries recommend 1.5
meters.10,11
The primary mode of transmission is thought to be
through droplet transmission when an infected person
coughs, sneezes, or talks during close contact. Droplets refer
to larger expelled particles that typically travel less than 6
feet before falling to the ground. More controversial is the
infective potential of smaller viral-containing particles
called ‘‘aerosols’’ (<5–10 mm in diameter), which travel
further and stay airborne longer. The measles virus and tu-
berculosis are familiar pathogens known to spread via
aerosols. The capacity of coronaviruses to infect by airborne
transmission has been an issue of uncertainty.12
The origin of the 1-meter distancing rule endorsed by the
WHO stems from work dating back to the 19th century by
Professor C. Flugge at the University of Breslau. Using
exposed plates at various distances to measure how far ex-
piratory droplets travel, bacteria-containing droplets were
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observed to settle quickly. It was concluded that infection
from droplets other than within a few feet of the ‘‘infector’’
was unlikely.13 As late as 1996, a CDC guideline on in-
fectious isolation precautions concurred with the 3-foot
distance, noting that droplets ‘‘do not remain suspended in
the air and generally travel only short distances, usually
three feet or less.’’14 With the new millennium came new
evidence questioning old dogma regarding airborne trans-
mission of respiratory infections and the 1 meter (3 foot)
recommendation. Olsen and colleagues studied more than
100 people who had potential in-flight exposure to the se-
vere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus.15 Of
the 23 passengers seated in the same row or in 3 rows di-
rectly in front of a symptomatic passenger who unknow-
ingly had SARS, 8 (35%) subsequently developed SARS. In
contrast, only 10/88 (11%) passengers seated elsewhere
became ill (relative risk, 3.1; 95% CI, 1.4 to 6.9). Of the
persons who became ill, 90% were seated more than 36
inches away from the index patient, suggesting that airborne
transmission of small viral particles was responsible. Cur-
rent CDC guidelines now recommend 6 feet of separation
for transmission avoidance.6
Whether 6 feet of distancing is sufficient has come under
increased scrutiny. Quantitative air samples of viral particles
taken at 1, 3, and 6 feet from influenza patients detect a
greater concentration of larger particles at 1 and 3 feet.
Samples at 6 feet are predominantly small particles but have
sufficient concentration to infect humans.16 The potential for
viruses to travel more than 6 feet in air may be affected by
several factors. Enclosed indoor spaces often have air cur-
rents that facilitate farther transport of particles. Current
social distancing recommendations pertain to persons who
are standing still. They do not take into account potential
aerodynamic effects introduced by movement such as brisk
walking, running, or cycling, which create a slipstream be-
hind the person carrying exhaled droplets well beyond
6 feet. Recent studies of respiratory emissions have dem-
onstrated that coughing and sneezing result in exhalation
speeds of up to 30 meters/second and create clouds of
varying sized droplets that travel up to 8 meters.17 There-
fore, it appears there are many conditions under which air-
borne transmission could well exceed 6 feet.
The relevance of these observations for COVID-19 is
presently uncertain but studies on the biodynamics of
aerosols containing SARS-CoV-2 are emerging. The air-
borne exposure of COVID-19 from hospitalized patients
was evaluated in Wuhan.18 Air samples were positive for the
virus in 35% of samples taken in the intensive care unit and
12.5% of samples taken from general wards. Notably, the
transmission distance for COVID-19 was up to 4 meters.
SARS-CoV-2 has been shown to be viable in aerosols for up
to 3 hours and on surfaces for up to 3 days.19 The potential
for airborne transmission is likely greatest in enclosed in-
door spaces with poor ventilation. These concerns were
expressed in a recent commentary supported by more than
200 scientists urging the WHO to update its guidance on the
risk of aerosol transmission of COVID-19.20
These contemporary data, including reports with COVID-
19, suggest the evidence base for recommending 6 feet of
interpersonal spacing in the current pandemic is poor. Al-
though it may be argued that 6 feet is practicable, there is no
reassurance that infectious risk is negligible at that distance.
A recent systematic review of measures to reduce viral
transmission concluded that infectious risk was reduced at a
1 meter distance but that longer distances were associated
with even greater benefit; it was estimated that relative risk
decreased 2-fold for each additional meter of distance.21 The
spacing length that can be both safe and pragmatic remains
unclear. Analogous to the inverse square law for radiation
safety, what is clear is that as one moves further away from
the source the risk of exposure lessens progressively.
Increasing concerns that COVID-19 may spread by
aerosols, which may be transmitted at distances beyond 6
feet, reinforce the role of mask wearing. Masks are espe-
cially important in settings where avoidance of close contact
is difficult. In the Harvard hospitals, universal masking of
both health care workers and patients was associated with a
significant reduction in the infection rate among health care
workers.22,23 Countries in which the populace have widely
adopted face mask use have experienced much lower rates
of COVID-19 spread.24
Avoiding Gatherings of More Than 10 People
On March 29, 2020, the President’s Coronavirus Guide-
lines for America recommended avoiding social gatherings
of more than 10 people. Most health organizations dis-
courage ‘‘mass gatherings’’ during pandemics without
stipulating a threshold number. One reason to avoid mass
gatherings is the difficulty of maintaining adequate social
Table 1. Specific Recommendations for Nonpharmaceutical Interventions to Mitigate COVID-19
Interpersonal
distance
Quarantine
duration Mass gatherings
Handwashing
duration
CDC6 6 feet 14 days Varies by community ‡20 seconds
WHO7 1 meter (*3 feet) 14 days Case-by-case basis 40 to 60 seconds
ECDC8 — 14 days Discouraged without quantification 20 to 40 seconds
PCG — — Avoid gatherings of >10 people —
Agreement Among
Public Health
Organizations
Slight Discordance Uniform
Concordance
No Uniform Recommendation Moderate
Concordance
Strength of Evidence
for COVID-19
Weak Moderate Weak Moderate
CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; ECDC, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; PCG, President’s
Coronavirus Guidelines for America (www.whitehouse.gov); WHO, World Health Organization
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distance in such situations. To estimate a safe size for an
event would require knowing the prevalence of the illness in
the target population. For illustration, if the prevalence of
infection is 5%, a gathering of 10 people would have a 40%
probability that 1 or more of the attendees would be in-
fected. If the disease prevalence were 15% instead, the
probability that 1 or more of the attendees would be infected
would rise to 80%. Given the lack of widespread testing and
the evidence that most people infected with COVID-19 go
undiagnosed because of minimal or no symptoms, the
prevalence of the disease is unknown. In the absence of
these data, selecting a number at which to cap group gath-
erings appears arbitrary. Although there is no scientifically
definable cap number, the important concept is that the
potential for transmission will be directly proportional to the
size of the crowd. Therefore, from the risk of transmission
standpoint, bigger is not better. It is also important to em-
phasize that other factors beyond the size of the gathering
will influence potential spreading, notably the density of the
crowd and the length of exposure time.
Evidence to avoid crowding and public events is limited
and this accounts for the lack of expert consensus on the
effectiveness of this particular social intervention.25 There
are no prospective or randomized controlled trials on crowd
avoidance. The best evidence against mass gathering comes
from observational studies.26 The most well-known example
is the apparent effect of banning public gatherings and
closure of public places on reducing the death rate during
the influenza pandemic of 1918.5
Quarantine of Exposed Individuals for 14 Days
Quarantine is defined as the imposed separation or re-
striction of movement of persons who have been exposed to
others with the illness and who are not overtly ill, but who
may become infectious to others.1 Although the evidence
base is judged to be weak, quarantine is considered gener-
ally effective in reducing the burden and transmission ability
of disease and in delaying the peak of the epidemic.26
Studies from prior coronavirus outbreaks such as SARS and
MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome) have consis-
tently found a beneficial effect of quarantine, especially
when instituted with other social distancing measures.27–29
A recent review found a similar benefit of quarantine in
COVID-19, although the certainty of the evidence was low
because the only available studies were based on simulation
modeling.29
Major health organizations concordantly recommend a
14-day quarantine period for COVID-19 exposed individu-
als (Table 1). The duration of quarantine is determined by
the specifics of the incubation period from infection expo-
sure to development of symptoms. A pooled analysis of 181
cases reported a median incubation period of 5.1 days with
97.5% developing symptoms within 11.5 days.30 It was
estimated that 101 out of every 10,000 cases will develop
symptoms after 14 days of quarantine. Documented cases of
COVID-19 with incubation periods greater than 14 days
have been reported.31
Based on the available data, a 14-day quarantine for in-
dividuals recently exposed to COVID-19 is reasonable,
recognizing that *1% of cases will not develop symptoms
until after 14 days.30 It also could be argued that quarantine
should be extended beyond 14 days, particularly for indi-
viduals with contacts who are immunocompromised or have
other high-risk factors. On the other hand, prolonged quar-
antine can have adverse consequences by placing a signifi-
cant burden on working people and social services.32
Duration of Handwashing Should Be
at Least 20 Seconds
In addition to social distancing measures, other non-
pharmaceutical interventions focus on the importance of
personal hygiene. Health organizations universally endorse
proper hand hygiene as part of their recommendations for
controlling the spread of COVID-19.6–8 Handwashing has
been demonstrated in multiple studies to effectively remove
bacteria from hands and reduce the spread of foodborne and
respiratory illneses.33,34 The duration of handwashing is an
important issue because observational studies indicate that
time spent in washing generally falls far short of the re-
commended duration.35 In public restrooms, mean hand-
washing time is only 5 seconds. Even in hospital settings,
handwashing times among health care workers fall short
with mean durations of approximately 10 seconds.
The recommended handwashing duration varies among
international health organizations (Table 1). However, all
organizations recommend a duration of ‡20 seconds. The
CDC recognizes that, ‘‘determining the optimal length of
time for handwashing is difficult because few studies about
the health impacts of altering handwashing times have been
done.’’36 A number of studies found that washing hands for
15 to 30 seconds removes significantly more germs than
washing for shorter periods.33,37–39 Studies of healthy vol-
unteers have shown that 20-second lather times result in a
significant 0.5 log reduction in bacterial colony-forming
units more than 5-second wash times.38 It should be noted
that no studies have analyzed the role of handwashing
specifically for COVID-19. Nevertheless, the available ev-
idence supports the recommendation of frequent hand-
washing and a target lather time of at least 20 seconds.
Conclusion
Reflecting the scant scientific data, the guidelines offered
by public health organizations differ from each other in their
specific recommendations for personal spacing distance and
duration of handwashing. Recent studies contest the pre-
sumption that infectious risk is negligible at a 6-foot distance
for COVID-19. More research is needed to resolve these areas
of uncertainty. Although exact thresholds and relative value of
individual measures are unclear, data from population-level,
observational, and simulation modeling studies support the
importance of social distancing and other nonpharmaceutical
interventions in the mitigation of the COVID-19 pandemic.
By ‘‘flattening the curve,’’ nonpharmaceutical interventions
reduce and delay transmission within the population, prevent
medical resources from becoming overtaxed, and buy time for
the development of more definitive therapies. As countries
have begun to reopen and social distancing measures have
become more lax, the resurgence of cases in many regions has
been an unwelcome confirmation of the importance of these
public health interventions.
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